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    • The results for the second reform show that in the

    2018-11-15

    The results for the second reform show that, in the short-term, the capital stocks in both sectors (k and ) remain close to the initial steady state values, while employment grows by 3.65% in labor-intensive sector and decreases by 2.89% in the capital-intensive sector. These short-term effects end up raising the product of the sector I (growth of 2.52%) and slightly reducing the product of the sector (which falls nearly 0.71%). In the long term, growths of sectoral product are less expressive in reform 2 than in the first simulation. The reform 2 provides a smaller decline in employment of the capital-intensive sector and a less pronounced increase in the employment of the labor-intensive sector than in reform 1. Overall, the results of both reforms show that the labor-intensive sector (which is less taxed after the reforms) benefits from the payroll tax exemption. The growth of employment and output of the labor-intensive sector are the positive points of the two first reforms. It is important to say that our results depend on the range of values chosen for the constant elasticity of Tasquinimod parameter λ (see equation (13)). In fact, there is not an econometric consensus about a reasonable choice for this elasticity, which is a key parameter for our study. In order to overcome this difficulty, an analysis was performed to the parameter λ. The analysis suggests robust results within the range of λ∈[1.7, 2.5] (σ∈[1.66, 2.42]). Those are reasonable values because it is not expected neither perfect substitutes goods nor perfectly complementary goods between labor-intensive and capital-intensive sectors.
    Conclusion
    Acknowledgements W.B.S thanks CAPES, Brazil. N.L.P and R.O. gratefully acknowledge a research grant from CNPq, Brazil. W.B.S, N.L.P and R.O are grateful to the Brazilian School of Financial Management (ESAF).
    Introduction As it is difficult to change the allocation of public expenditures in Brazil, i.e., public spending for free allocation is limited, public spending improvements were suggested. In microeconomic terms, this can be translated as follows: offering more public services (products) with the same inputs (labor, equipment, etc.). Consequently, numerous Brazilian applied economics studies have empirically measured issues of public spending efficiency to promote effective public spending. Evaluations of several segments of the Brazilian public sector have been conducted in various empirical studies. Most, or perhaps all, of these studies conduct efficiency analyses of public organizations related to executive branches. However, it is critical to not only assess executive branch performance, but also legislative and judiciary performance. While numerous studies have evaluated local executive power at the municipal scale, none have examined the efficiency of local legislative production, despite the fact that city councils implement local public policies and thus enact effective (or ineffective) internal policies and incentives. Using city council efficiency scores obtained, we perform a regression analysis to determine specific areas of city council inefficiency. For this regression, explanatory variables used are non-discretionary, environmental variables, and the explained variable is a vector that includes only inefficient council scores. We also investigate whether city council inefficiency is attributable to councilor education levels. Ferraz and Finan (2008) noted that more highly educated politicians exhibit superior legislative performance. Thus, it is hypothesized that: more highly educated councilors make more legislative decisions (law approvals and propositions), decreasing inefficiency. In addition to this introduction, this article includes four sections. The flowing section elaborates on concepts of efficiency and production and on indicators used to determine efficiency scores and environmental variable coefficients. In Section 3, features of the Interlegis census, production plan, and environmental variables used for the efficiency analysis are described. Section 4 presents the study results. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and avenues for future research.